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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

Even though the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was passed
thirty-one years ago, determining state versus tribal jurisdiction over
the various components of Indian child welfare proceedings in a
2
Public Law 280 state remains a confusing area of the law. This
† The author is a member of the Yurok Tribe. He is presently employed by
the Corporate Commission of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians and
previously worked as an associate at Best and Flanagan LLP.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326
(2006). Public Law 280 was a transfer of jurisdiction from the federal government to
state governments. Congress gave six states (five states initially—California,
Minnesota (except the Red Lake Nation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm
Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin (except later the Menominee Reservation); and
then Alaska upon statehood) extensive criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal lands
within the affected states. Since then, Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, Florida,
Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Arizona, Iowa, and Utah have assumed some
jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribal members on tribal lands. Public Law 280
also permitted the other states to acquire jurisdiction at their option.
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jurisdictional determination goes to the heart of tribal sovereignty
and a tribe’s ability to self-govern because nothing is more central to a
tribal government than the protection of its tribal members, particularly its children.
3
Currently, this issue is central to the discussions between Tribes
in Wisconsin and the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families
as part of the Alternative Funding Workgroup. This workgroup is
tasked with exploring funding mechanisms that honor the government-to-government relationship between the State of Wisconsin and
the eleven tribal sovereigns within the state’s borders and that
recognize the vast array of services that tribal social service systems
provide. Unfortunately, the uncertainty surrounding Indian child
welfare jurisdiction has frustrated the progress of the workgroup.
Without establishing which sovereign has the jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian child welfare issues, it is difficult to decipher which
sovereign also has the responsibility to fund the services provided to
the citizens who are the subjects of the Indian child welfare case at
hand.
This article will address the jurisdictional issues between Tribes in
4
Wisconsin subject to Public Law 280 and the State of Wisconsin itself
along with an analysis of which sovereign is responsible for funding
the services to the families.
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE ICWA AND PUBLIC LAW 280.
Generally, jurisdiction refers to “[a] government’s general power
5
to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory.”
Determining which governmental entity would exercise jurisdiction
over Indian children was one of the core interests of Congress when it
6
passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Before the passage of

3. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians; Lac Court Oreilles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians; Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians; Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians; Sokaogan
Mole Lake Community; St. Croix Chippewa Indians; Forest County Potawatomi;
Stockbridge Munsee Community; Menominee Indian Tribe; Oneida Native American
Tribes of Wisconsin; Ho-Chunk Nation.
4. The Menominee Indian Tribe is not subject to Public Law 280 due to
termination and later restoration of the tribe. Memorandum from Senior Staff
Attorney Joyce L. Kiel to Members of the Special Comm. on State-Tribal Relations 2
n.6 (Dec. 10, 2004), www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/2004/STR/
files/memono3_str.pdf.
5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009).
6. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
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this Act, state courts had exercised jurisdiction and “failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the social and
cultural standards in tribal communities, and thus harmed tribal
7
interests.” The ICWA was designed to remedy these failures by
8
creating presumptive jurisdiction in tribal courts.
The ICWA established a dual-jurisdiction paradigm. “[T]ribes
have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters when the Indian
child resides or is domiciled on an Indian reservation, or when the
child is a ward of the tribal court, unless another federal law provides
9
otherwise . . . .” Tribes also have concurrent jurisdiction with the
state over Indian children who reside or are domiciled off the
10
reservation.
The ICWA’s reference in section 1911(a) to exclusive jurisdiction, unless other federal law provides otherwise, presumably refers to
11
Public Law 280, which was passed decades earlier. Instead of
clarifying the jurisdictional interrelation between the ICWA and
12
Public Law 280, Congress, in passage of the ICWA, left that issue to
be decided by the courts.
To understand how the two federal acts interplay, it is prudent to
13
briefly review the history of each act. Generally, Public Law 280 was
passed to address the perceived lack of criminal law enforcement on
tribal lands. However, Public Law 280 also contained a civil jurisdic14
tion provision intended to allow for native people to have their civil
issues heard in a state forum if a tribal forum did not exist. Unfortunately, the legislative language used by Congress to effectuate this
intent was not clear.
However, Supreme Court precedent has clarified the scope of
this jurisdictional grant. For example, in Bryan v. Itasca, the Court
15
pronounced that Public Law 280 was “primarily intended to redress
7. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
ACT 16 (2007) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2006)).
8. Id. (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36
(1989)).
9. Id. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2006).
10. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2006).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326
(2006).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326
(2006).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326
(2006).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326
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the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes
between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private
16
citizens.”
The U.S. Supreme Court also addressed the scope of Public Law
17
18
280 in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. In Cabazon, the
Court analyzed whether California’s gaming law was applicable within
the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians’s reservation under Public Law
19
280. To determine the scope of Public Law 280’s grant of state
jurisdiction, the Court focused on whether the law to be enforced was
20
criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory in nature.
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain
conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280’s grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at
issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is
whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public poli21
cy.
Applying this analysis, the Court held that the state’s gaming laws
22
were civil/regulatory.
California’s public policy did not forbid
gambling since the State operated its own lottery, authorized parimutuel betting on horses, and permitted many organizations to
23
conduct bingo and card games. The mere fact that California’s
regulations were enforced by misdemeanor penalties did not change
24
their civil/regulatory nature to criminal/prohibitory.
This background on Public Law 280 frames the discussion of the
interplay between Public Law 280 and the ICWA. The crux of the
analysis must begin with section 1911(a) of the ICWA, which ad(2006).
16. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 383–84 (1976). (stating that Public Law
280 did not give the states general regulatory powers over tribes and their members);
see also Jake J. Allen, Chipping Away at the Indian Child Welfare Act: Doe v. Mann and the
Court’s “1984” Interpretation of ICWA and P.L. 280 20–21 (Indigenous Law & Policy
Ctr., Working Paper No. 2007–03, 2007), available at http://www.law.msu.edu/
indigenous/papers/2007-03.pdf.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326
(2006).
18. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
19. Id. at 211–22.
20. Id. at 209–10.
21. Id. at 209.
22. Id. at 211–12.
23. Id. at 210.
24. Id. at 211.
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dresses exclusive tribal jurisdiction except where such jurisdiction is
25
otherwise vested in the state by existing federal law. This reference
to existing federal law is somewhat amorphous but has been generally
thought to reference Public Law 280. Based on the Bryan v. Itasca and
California v. Cabazon Supreme Court cases, the analysis as to whether
Public Law 280 confers jurisdiction upon the State within the
reservation is based upon whether the laws to be applied are civil/regulatory or criminal/prohibitory. This must be considered along
with the intent of Public Law 280 to provide a forum to hear disputes
between native people or between a native person and a non-native
state citizen in a state forum, thus focusing on private litigation.
Hence, based on Supreme Court precedent and Congress’s intent in passing Public Law 280, it is sound to conclude that actions
commenced by state agencies against parents to remove children or to
bring the family relationship under court supervision fall within the
civil/regulatory analysis of Supreme Court precedence. Those actions
also fall outside of the private party actions contemplated by Congress
in passing Public Law 280. Furthermore, the Attorney General of
Wisconsin found that involuntary proceedings to terminate parental
rights based on neglect or abuse are regulatory in nature and fall
26
outside the boundary of the State’s Public Law 280 civil jurisdiction.
Therefore, in the State of Wisconsin, a reassumption of jurisdiction
under the ICWA section 1918(a) is not required for the tribe to have
exclusive jurisdiction within the reservation boundaries.
This means that all phases of a child welfare investigation or proceeding fall within the jurisdiction of the tribe when the child is
domiciled within the reservation. The phases include, but are not
limited to, Child Protective Services initial assessment investigations,
removal of children from the home, and child in need of protection
27
or services cases.
The case typically cited in opposition to this analysis is Doe v.
28
Mann. However, this case has no binding authority in Wisconsin and
fails to address the Wisconsin-specific analysis that is the subject of this
29
article. The Doe v. Mann opinion is flawed in pointing to In re Burgess
as somehow diminishing the effect of the 1981 Wisconsin Attorney
25.
26.
27.

25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2006).
70 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 237 (1981). See also Allen, supra note 16, at 14.
See e.g., NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASSOCIATION, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
GLOSSARY AND FLOWCHART 3, http://www.narf.org/icwa/resources/flowcharts/
glossary.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2009).
28. 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005).
29. 665 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 2003).
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General Opinion that specifically addresses child welfare jurisdiction
under the Indian Child Welfare Act in the State of Wisconsin. In re
Burgess did not deal with child welfare jurisdiction, but instead was an
30
insanity proceeding by the State against a sexually violent individual.
In re Burgess did, however, partly address Wisconsin’s Public Law
31
280 jurisdiction. In addressing the Public Law 280 issues in In re
Burgess, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact that
Mr. Burgess challenged the jurisdiction of the state court to adjudi32
cate his issues as a tribal member domiciled on the reservation. The
district court contacted the Lac du Flambeau Tribal Court to
determine if the Tribal Court was able and willing to exercise
33
jurisdiction over the matter. The Lac du Flambeau Tribal Court
declined jurisdiction because the tribe had not yet passed an ordinance to address the commitment of sexually violent persons such as
34
Burgess. But for this declination of jurisdiction, it is quite probable
that the case would have been transferred to Lac du Flambeau Tribal
Court at that time. This fact was a crucial threshold issue tipping the
balance, in the supreme court’s opinion, towards determining that
the state had jurisdiction over the matter.
The supreme court stated,
[f]urthermore, the tribal court in this case declined to accept jurisdiction because the Lac du Flambeau Tribe had
not yet passed an ordinance regarding the commitment of
sexually violent persons. Thus, the appropriateness of state
jurisdiction is bolstered since one of the stated purposes of
Pub. L. 280 was to ‘redress the lack of adequate Indian fo35
rums.’
Therefore, if the Lac du Flambeau Tribe had passed an ordinance and accepted jurisdiction over the matter when the district court
inquired whether the tribal court was going to exercise jurisdiction,
the case would have been transferred. Had it been transferred, the
supreme court’s decision would have likely tipped in the other
direction, towards allowing a finding under a Public Law 280 analysis
that the tribal court was the proper court to exercise jurisdiction over
this matter.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 127.
Id. at 129–30.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 127–28.
Id.
Id. at 133.
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This analysis of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision In re Burgess is bolstered by the opinions rendered upon appeal by the U.S.
36
District Court of the Western District of Wisconsin and the 7th
37
Circuit. The opinion from the federal district court notes the great
weight given the tribal court’s declination of jurisdiction and further
38
Unfortunately, the
states that Burgess’s argument has merit.
standard in this appeal was substantial, which resulted in the court’s
holding that
[i]n sum, even if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were incorrect
to conclude that Chapter 980 falls within the scope of Pub.
L. 280’s jurisdictional grant, this conclusion is not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Therefore, Burgess is not entitled to habeas relief on his first
39
claim.
The 7th Circuit, likewise, treated the declination of jurisdiction
by the tribal court as a threshold issue because it noted that as a result
of that declination, the district court denied Burgess’s motion based
on its understanding that the State was allowed to assert jurisdiction
over reservation Indians in any area where the tribe did not have an
40
ongoing tradition of acting. The 7th Circuit took issue with the
analysis used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to hold that the State
of Wisconsin had jurisdiction over a tribal member residing on the
reservation. The 7th Circuit stated “[w]ith respect, we cannot agree
with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that Chapter 980 qualifies as a
41
‘criminal statute.’”
Furthermore, the 7th Circuit stated, “[i]n the final analysis, if this
case turned solely on the question whether clearly established federal
law would permit a characterization of chapter 980 as criminal, we
42
would need to reverse.” In the 7th Circuit’s analysis, they started
with the premise in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Bryan v. Itasca
County that the civil grant in Public Law 280 was primarily intended
“to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private
legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and
36.
2005).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Burgess v. Watters, No. 04-C-544-C, 2005 WL 106780 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 19,
Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2006).
Burgess, 2005 WL 106780, at *11.
Burgess, 2005 WL 106780, at *14.
Burgess, 467 F.3d at 679–80.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 676, 686.
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other private citizens,” not to “confer general state civil regulatory
43
authority over reservation Indians.” The appellate court also stated,
“[t]his court has questioned whether a state would have jurisdiction
involuntarily to commit an enrolled tribal member, but we did not
44
need to decide this issue.”
There are certainly strong arguments that Chapter 980 falls outside Public Law 280’s limited grant of civil jurisdiction. In other
contexts, the Supreme Court has expressly classified these types of
45
civil laws that aim to protect the public from danger as “regulatory.”
The 7th Circuit also noted that at least one court has determined that
a state lacks the authority to involuntarily commit a mentally ill tribal
46
member who resides on a reservation. The 7th Circuit also cited the
47
1981 Wisconsin Attorney General opinion as bolstering its opinion
that exercising the jurisdiction is not within Public Law 280’s grant of
48
jurisdiction over Indian Country in the State of Wisconsin. The
49
court did note that Doe v. Mann has taken a different approach to
interpreting Public Law 280’s limited grant of civil authority and
50
therefore “[t]his is enough to show, under the generous AEDPA
standards, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion does not
lie outside the bounds of permissible differences of opinion. We thus
cannot conclude that the court unreasonably applied clearly estab51
lished federal law.”
Given the Seventh Circuit’s sharp criticism of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rationale for concluding that the State could exercise
43. Id. at 686 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 384 (1976)).
44. Id. See also United States v. Teller, 762 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting
that “questions of jurisdiction are raised by two facts—the crime took place on an
Indian reservation, and so trial was to be in federal court, and the defendant is an
Indian, and so perhaps not subject to the state’s civil commitment procedures”).
45. Burgess, 467 F.3d at 686–87. See also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003);
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361–62 (1983). The Supreme Court has also
held that a state has authority under its police power to protect the community from
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. See generally Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
46. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D.S.D. 1977), aff’d., 581 F.2d 697
(8th Cir. 1978) (determining that because “the process of committing someone
involuntarily brings the power of the state deep into the lives of the persons involved
in the commitment process. . . . [A]pplying the procedures of an involuntary
commitment to an Indian person in Indian country would require severe intrusions
into the tribe’s vestigial sovereignty”).
47. 70 Wis. Op. Att’y. Gen. 237 (1981).
48. Burgess, 467 F.3d at 687.
49. 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005).
50. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
51. Burgess, 467 F.3d at 687.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/11

8

Puzz: Untangling the Jurisdictional Web: Determining Indian Child Welfa
10. Puzz.docx

732

1/18/2010 10:41 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

Public Law 280 jurisdiction to civilly commit a tribal member
domiciled on the reservation, it is likely that absent the generous
standard of review applicable to the case, the 7th Circuit would have
overruled the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
All but one tribe in the State of Wisconsin have tribal courts
which regularly exercise jurisdiction over child welfare matters and,
therefore, even under the Wisconsin Supreme Court analysis, the
issue should be properly heard in a tribal court.
For any criminal abuse or neglect charges that may come to light
from a child protective services investigation, the criminal jurisdiction
is concurrent within the reservation under Public Law 280. Therefore, the tribe could prosecute such offenses but is limited by the
Indian Civil Rights Act as to the penalties that can be assessed. The
Indian Civil Rights Act limits a tribe to imposing a maximum of one
52
year of imprisonment and a fine of $5000, or both. The state could
also prosecute that same individual for the same criminal charges
under its jurisdictional authority and there would not be a double
53
jeopardy argument available to the defendant. Off the reservation,
the state would have criminal jurisdiction to proceed against the tribal
member.
III. THE IMPACT OF WISCONSIN’S CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES LAW
Wisconsin law requires the state agency to investigate any reports
54
received about child abuse or neglect. This requirement attaches to
55
all abuse or neglect reports within the state’s jurisdiction. The state
was not granted jurisdiction over child welfare or child protective
services (CPS) issues within reservations located in the State of
56
Wisconsin.
The ICWA does allow for emergency removal or
placement of a child, but only when the emergency removal is of an
Indian child who is a resident of or is domiciled on a reservation but
57
temporarily located off the reservation.
If a tribe is not able to provide twenty-four hour CPS to tribal
members, the tribe could enter an intergovernmental agreement with
52. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006).
53. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 330 (1978) (noting that it does not
violate the Fifth Amendment provision against double jeopardy for the Tribe and the
federal government to prosecute a defendant for the same offense; both independent
sovereigns are entitled to vindicate their identical public policies).
54. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)1.a (West Supp. 2009).
55. Id.
56. See supra Part I.
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (2006) (emphasis added).
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the county agencies surrounding the reservation for any coverage the
tribe could not provide as part of the tribe’s inherent sovereign
58
powers.
IV. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND REMOVAL AUTHORITY
It has been reported that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)
has taken the position with Tribal Child Welfare programs that BIA
funds cannot be used for CPS investigations and the removal of
59
children from homes. This assertion by the BIA is not founded in
the language of the ICWA nor in any regulations or the BIA Guide60
lines for state courts. The jurisdictional discussion in Part I, above,
indicates that the tribes have full authority to conduct CPS investiga61
tions and remove children when warranted.
The BIA may be taking the position that they are a payor of last
resort and, because Wisconsin Statutes mandate county social services
to do CPS investigations, that the State should have the responsibility
for funding such investigations. This argument is flawed, however,
because the State was not granted any jurisdiction to conduct CPS
62
investigations within the reservation.
V. REASSUMPTION OF EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION UNDER THE ICWA
According to the Wisconsin Attorney General, a reassumption of
exclusive jurisdiction under the ICWA affects proceedings that do not
fall within the civil regulatory jurisdiction granted to the State under
63
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Public Law 280. Examples of
non-regulatory proceedings that may fall under the jurisdictional
grant of Public Law 280 are proceedings such as a voluntary termina64
tion of parental rights and voluntary adoption proceedings. Without
a reassumption of exclusive jurisdiction, these actions may be subject
to concurrent jurisdiction. The reassumption would eliminate the
58. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(9)(cm) (West Supp. 2009).
59. See e.g., Administration for Children and Families, Considerations for Indian
Tribes, Indian Tribal Organizations or Tribal Consortia Seeking to Operate a Tribal
Title
IV-E
Program,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/
tribal_considerations.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2009).
60. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006). See also Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for
State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 FED. REG. 67584 (Nov. 26, 1979),
available at http://www.nicwa.org/policy/regulations/icwa/ICWA_guidelines.pdf.
61. See supra Part I.
62. See supra Part III.
63. 70 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 237, 3 (1981).
64. Id. at 4.
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State’s concurrent jurisdiction over these actions within the reservation, or over the area granted exclusive jurisdiction under the petition
65
as accepted by the federal government.
VI. VOLUNTARY ACTIONS AND STATE COURT JURISDICTION
Tribes have exclusive jurisdiction in the State of Wisconsin over
involuntary child welfare proceedings within the reservation when the
66
child is residing on or domiciled within the reservation. If the tribe
has reassumed exclusive jurisdiction under the ICWA, the tribe also
67
has jurisdiction over voluntary child welfare proceedings.
This
exclusive jurisdiction does not allow a state court to hear these matters
absent an intergovernmental agreement allowing the State to exercise
such jurisdiction in accordance with any limitations drafted in the
agreement.
VII. CHILD WELFARE SERVICES AND FUNDING
Jurisdiction and financial responsibility are two separate concepts. “Jurisdiction refers to the authority of a government to
adjudicate or decide a particular legal matter in its court, while service
responsibility refers to the particular government which is responsible
for providing services to the children and families involved in a
68
particular child welfare proceeding.” Tribal members are tri-citizens
because they are citizens of their tribe, the United States, and the state
69
in which they reside. This status entitles them to state services
which, as state citizens, they are eligible to receive, even if the tribe
70
exercises jurisdiction in a particular case. In child welfare situations,
many of the services provided to children and families by the State will

65. Id.
66. Id. at 7; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2006) (“An Indian tribe shall have
jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
67. 70 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 237 (1981).
68. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, supra note 7, at 18.
69. Id.
70. Id. See also Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F. 3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act created a Section 1983 cause of action to
obtain child support from absent parents living on Indian reservations), limited by
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (limiting standing under Section 1983);
Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1145 (2004) (citing a string of cases in which
tribal members have been found to have rights to equal state services notwithstanding
their tribal membership).
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be partially federally funded. The federal funding prohibits States
from discriminating upon the basis of race or political subdivision
71
within the state.
The U.S. Constitution guarantees the equal protection of the laws
72
to all of its citizens through the Fourteenth Amendment. Tribal
members who were not already granted citizenship were made citizens
73
of the United States by the 1924 Snyder Act. State citizenship was
officially recognized only in the 1970s, by a combination of the
74
Therefore tribal
Fourteenth Amendment and the Snyder Act.
members are citizens of all three sovereigns: the United States, the
individual state in which they are domiciled, and the tribe of which
75
they are a member.
This tri-citizenship means that enrolled members of an Indian
76
tribe are guaranteed the equal protection of the laws. Therefore, if a
State pays for the placement of other state children as ordered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, it must also do so for tribal children
who happen to also be citizens of another sovereign.
While the Equal Protection Clause guarantees against infringement of civil liberties by the States, States have not historically
afforded tribal members equal protection when provision of state
services are at issue. States often argue that because trust land is not
subject to state property taxes, tribal members should not benefit
77
from the services paid through property taxation. Another popular
argument is that the welfare of Indian people is the sole responsibility
71. See Native American Rights Fund, A Practical Guide to the Indian Child
Welfare Act, FAQ 2: Jurisdiction, http://www.narf.org/icwa/faq/jurisdiction.htm#qa
(last visited Jan. 2, 2010) (noting that most federal funding sources, such as the Social
Security Act’s Title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption Assistance, have requirements tied
to the receipt of these funds).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006).
74. Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Ariz. 1976), aff’d sub
nom. Apache County v. United States, 492 U.S. 876 (1976).
75. Citizenship requirements for the tribal sovereign are heavily influenced by
the Tribe’s constitution. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 4.01(2)(a)–(c) (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) (1940).
76. See Krakoff, supra note 70, at 1145. Equal protection under tribal law is itself
guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006).
77. See Acosta v. County of San Diego, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 459 (1954); see also
Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First
Century? Some Data At Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 704 (2006) (“Because reservation
trust lands are exempt from state and local property taxes, and tribal members living
and earning income on reservations are exempt from state taxes, some of the most
important sources of funding for local law enforcement and criminal justice on
reservations were unavailable.”).
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of the federal government. Both of these arguments have failed in
the courts under an equal protection analysis because States do not
base services to their non-Indian citizens on proof of taxpaying status,
and the federal government has not fulfilled its trust responsibility in
79
a manner that takes care of all tribal member needs. As an example,
the courts have held that services must be rendered to Indians just as
they are to non-Indians in the following categories: admission into
80
81
public schools; general relief services; and indigent health servic82
es. The courts have upheld the right of Indians to access these social
services in the same manner as other citizens of the state. This same
analysis would apply to social services rendered to other state citizens
in the child welfare arena.
Therefore, even though the tribes may exercise child welfare
jurisdiction in various cases, this does not alleviate the counties or the
State from their duty to provide services to those Wisconsin citizens
who also happen to be citizens of a tribal sovereign.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Due in part to the federal government’s policy of supporting tribal self-governance, tribal governmental structure has flourished in
the last couple of decades. One area of dramatic growth and
development has been in the area of child welfare. Every tribe in the
State of Wisconsin has a child welfare department and all but one
83
tribe have a court with child welfare subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the tribes have this well-developed infrastructure, the State of
Wisconsin is required to defer to tribal jurisdiction. This is not only a
legal requirement but it is good policy; no other governmental unit is
better equipped to resolve the interplay of tribal culture, custom, and
tradition with the child welfare laws to the benefit of the whole family
structure, which includes the family’s connection to the tribe.
78. See Acosta, 126 Cal. App. 2d at 462.
79. Id. at 462, 466 (holding that “the jurisdiction of the United States over the
Indians residing on Indian reservations . . . is not exclusive” and that tax-exempt
status does not “serve[] as a justification for [the denial of] equal treatment under
state welfare laws”).
80. See Piper v. Big Pine Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 674 (1924).
81. See Acosta, 126 Cal. App. 2d at 466.
82. See County of Blaine v. Moore, 568 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Mont. 1977).
83. Currently the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin does not have a court that
exercises child welfare jurisdiction. See Oneida Tribal Judicial System Home Page,
http://www.oneidanation.org/government/page.aspx?id=4780 (last visited Nov. 27,
2009) (listing types of cases the court reviews).
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The more difficult pill to swallow is that deferring to tribal jurisdiction does not absolve the State of funding responsibilities to the
tribal families as “tri-citizens.” This concept is difficult for most legal
minds to grasp because of the unique situation that is presented for
analysis when tribal members are involved. Typically, when another
sovereign asserts jurisdiction, it also takes on funding responsibility,
usually because of a change in domicile for the parties involved. In
the case of Indian families, the citizenship status of the family
members as to the State of Wisconsin does not change simply because
the tribal court asserts jurisdiction over the family for the purposes of
adjudicating the child welfare matter at hand.
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